v. ) CASE NO. T0028053
John Davis Lee II )
SPECIAL APPEARANCE TO CONTEST PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND COUNTERCLAIMS
WITH MOTIONS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
AND MOTION FOR TRIAL BY MAGISTRATE
Defendant, John Lee, pro se and in forma pauperis, makes a Special Appearance to contest personal jurisdiction, and to answer to the complaint.
Pro se litigants are entitled to the
same liberality of construction with regard to pleadings that
Defendant is disabled and has zero income from any source. Defendant’s spouse owns title to the automobile that Defendant was traveling in. Defendant invokes his Tennessee Homestead Exemption per TCA 26-2-301, and tenancy in the entirety regarding title.
Tenancy by the entirety.
A joint tenancy that arises between husband and wife when a single instrument conveys realty to both of them.
—Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Edition
Property held in tenancy by the entirety is exempt from the debts owed by one spouse. In re Arango, 992 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1993)
Defendant is a “traveler” under the common law, and is not engaged in commercial transportation “for hire”. Defendant retains his Constitutionally protected God-given Natural Right to travel, and retains his Constitutionally protected rights to freedom from unreasonable stops, detentions, searches and seizures.
Complainant is “’Josh’ Antras”, an employee of a person identifying itself in its Comprehension Annual Financial Report (CAFR) as “Blount County Government”, department of sheriff, located in Maryville, Tennessee, and is a subsidiary of a person identified as “State of Tennessee”.
Defendant states as follows:
First Defense—Lack of Personal Jurisdiction—Duress
Defendant makes Special Appearance to deny that a valid contract exists for Summons and Service of Process of Notice and Complaint. Defendant involuntarily signed his name to “Blount County Sheriff’s Office Multiple Offense Citation”, also known as “citation in-lieu-of-arrest”, under threats, duress and coercion from an armed employee of “Blount County Government”, identified on complaint as “JANTRAS”, a/k/a “’Josh’ Antras”.
Complainant Antras declared that he would arrest Defendant immediately, if Defendant refused to sign for service of process of the complaint, notice and summons, as recorded by Plaintiff’s audio portion of “FLASHBACK DVR In-Car Digital Video Recorder” system, and preserved on digital computer recording devices, in possession of Plaintiff, located in Plaintiff’s business records.
Under said threats and duress, in fear of his life and liberty from an openly armed gunman, Defendant did involuntarily sign his name, in block of complaint/summons titled “VIOLATOR’S SIGNATURE”, by crossing out the word “VIOLATOR’S”, and by including the words “under duress” after his signature. Although gunman did not brandish his firearm, he put his hand on his firearm in its holster, in preparation for “quickdraw” and summary execution of Defendant. Gunman also radioed for “backup”, and a second as yet unidentified gunman arrived, and stood within touching distance of the vehicle Defendant was traveling in, and also presumably would have participated in a summary execution of Defendant by Death Squad.
Defendant’s coerced signature does not waiver his right to contest personal jurisdiction, due to improper service of process, under Rule 4 of Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, and Tennessee Code:
(1) "A party who, with explicit reservation of rights, performs or promises performance or assents to performance in a manner demanded or offered by the other party does not thereby prejudice the rights reserved. Such words as 'without prejudice,' 'under protest' or the like are sufficient."
Defendant’s “signature” on his “Tennessee Driver License” does also display the term “TCA §47-1-207” beside said signature, indicating reservation of all rights. Legislative intent acknowledges the lack of proper service of process of “traffic citations”, when a party to an action threatens criminal prosecution to gain advantage in a civil action, which would result in arrest and/or disbarment of a private attorney for the crime of extortion.
The power to punish for contempt conferred by this section may NOT be used to punish persons who fail to appear for traffic violations or parking violations.
Defendant appears in this Court unwillingly, under threat, coercion and duress, in fear of summary execution by Death Squad and/or other retaliations, if he did not appear in this Court to answer this complaint. Such appearance in court to contest personal jurisdiction is not a waiver of that defense.
Judicial Notice of Fact—Police State Death Squads—Duress
Pursuant to Rule 201 of Tennessee Rules of Evidence, Defendant moves the Court for written Judicial Notice of Fact that Police State Death Squads perform over 300 annual summary executions of American citizens, without trial, during service of process for civil “traffic citations” for alleged breach of civil “Driver License” contracts, including innocent bystanders, according to frequent news reports, such as the “Rodney Glenn King beating” for the alleged crime of “speeding” down a freeway offramp in Los Angeles, California (which resulted in over 60 homicides during the resultant riots), and also reported by:
“POLICE PURSUIT IN PURSUIT OF POLICY: THE PURSUIT ISSUE, LEGAL AND LITERATURE REVIEW, AND AN EMPIRICAL STUDY, SUMMARY REPORT”, by Michael T. Charles, Ph. D., David N. Falcone, Ph. D., Edward Wells, Ph. D.; Illinois State University, Department of Criminal Justice Sciences, Normal, Illinois; Sponsored by AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety, 1730 Main Street, NW, Suite 401, Washington, D.C. 20036 (April, 1992)
The National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration NHTSA reported for 1990, that there were 314 fatalities
resulting from police pursuits. Data collection methods used by the NHTSA in
establishing this data base, however, indicate that this is an underestimation
of the actual number of deaths that occur as a result of pursuits. In 1989, the
NHTSA reported that the highest fatality rates were in
Only 14% of the pursuits reported were initiated for felony reasons.
Using data provided by 18 reporting departments, 26% of the pursuits resulted in an accident; these mostly occurred to the suspect vehicle (80% of the pursuit-related accidents), with 16% of the accidents involving a bystander vehicle.
Defendant moves the Court for written Judicial Notice of
Fact that in approximately September of 2001, a Police State Death Squad in
Such Police State Death Squads routinely use threats, coercion and duress against defendants, to force signing of “voluntary” contracts.
Second Defense—Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction—Duress
Defendant denies that a valid contract exists for “Tennessee Driver License”.
Defendant originally entered into contract for “Tennessee Driver License” at age of 16 years, which is below the age of consent for contracts, thus voiding the contract under Statute of Frauds. Thereafter, Defendant was coerced, under threats and duress from armed gunmen, employed by “Tennessee Department of Safety”, and “Knox County Sheriff’s Department”, to involuntarily sign his signature to subsequent “Driver License” contracts, under fear of summary execution by Police State Death Squad, and/or loss of liberty and/or financial losses. At no time was Defendant given an informed option by Plaintiffs, of traveling by that particular method of locomotion, without entering into that involuntary contract.
Third Defense—Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction—Fraudulent Inducement
Defendant maintains that said contract is currently void under Statute of Frauds, as there has not been a “meeting of the minds” as to the terms of the “voluntary” contract, there was a lack of consideration provided by Plaintiff, and there was breach of contract by Plaintiff, and there was fraudulent inducement by Plaintiff.
Fourth Defense—Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction—Void for Vagueness
Defendant also maintains that said contract is Constitutionally void for vagueness, under Tennessee Constitution and U.S. Constitution, since Plaintiff fails to provide annual annotated “hard copies” of all clauses of this contract (Tennessee Code Title 55 and others), that changes every year, ex-post-facto to Defendant’s involuntary signature to said contract. Plaintiff fails to provide annual updated printed copies of this contract (TCA Title 55, etc.) to Defendant, mailed at Plaintiff’s expense. Plaintiff likewise fails to provide Defendant with annual updated copies of “Tennessee Rules of Court”, mailed to Defendant, at Plaintiff’s expense. Even if Plaintiff did provide such notice of contract, said contract is too voluminous to be comprehended, rendering it void for vagueness.
Judicial Notice of Law—Mandatory Notice
Pursuant to Rule
202(a), Tennessee Rules of Evidence, Defendant moves the court for mandatory Judicial
Notice of Law, per Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 202 (a), of (1)
the common law, (2) the constitutions of the
Judicial Notice of Law—“Driver License” Contract
Defendant moves the Court for written Judicial Notice of Law, as to whether or not a “Tennessee Driver License” is a civil contract, under “Roman Civil Law”, “Napoleonic Civil Law”, “Uniform Commercial Code”, or any other form of civil law. If it is a civil contract, then defendant moves the Court for mandatory written Judicial Notice of Law as to whether or not that contract must be entered into voluntarily and knowingly, and whether Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure apply for appeals of “small offenses” to Circuit Court.
Judicial Notice of Fact—Local Rules of Court
Defendant moves the Court for written Judicial Notice of Fact that “Blount County General Sessions Court” has NOT published any “Local Rules of Court” that are available from (1) “Blount County Circuit Court Clerk”, (2) “Blount County General Sessions Court Clerk”, nor (3) “Blount County Traffic Citations Clerk”.
Judicial Notice of Law—Rules of Procedure on Appeal to Circuit Court
Defendant moves the Court for written Judicial Notice of Law as to which Rules of Procedure to use on appeal of this case to the Circuit Court a/k/a Criminal Court, either TRCP or Tenn. R. Crim. P.. Is this case classified as a “small offense”, or was that statute repealed? Is a “small offense” civil or criminal, regarding which Rules of Procedure to use on appeal?
Rules of Civil Procedure apply to cases appealed to the circuit court from the
general sessions court, but they do not require the filing of written
pleadings, issuance of new process, or any other steps which have been
completed prior to appeal. Vinson v.
Mills, 530 S.W.2d 761 (
Judicial Notice of Fact—No Public Access to Law Library
the Court for written Judicial Notice of Fact that “
Judicial Notice of Fact—Denial of Subpoena Power
Defendant moves the Court for written Judicial Notice of Fact that Tom Hatcher, a former deputy sheriff with Blount County Sheriff Department, is currently employed as “Blount County Circuit Court Clerk”, and that Mr. Hatcher does in fact illegally refuse to provide subpoena forms to defendants, which is a criminal offense of Official Oppression under Tennessee Code §39-16-403.
allowed in criminal cases pursuant to Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976);
Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150 (1972); United States v. McCrane,
527 F.2d 906 (3d Cir. 1975); United
States v. Moceri, 359 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Ohio 1973); State v. Brown, 552 S.W.2d 383 (
Judicial Notice of Fact—Jury Tampering
Defendant moves the Court for written Judicial Notice of Fact that Tom Hatcher, currently employed as “Blount County Circuit Court Clerk”, does in fact illegally refuse to provide public notice of Grand Jury hearings, posted daily in the court house, as required under Tennessee Code §40-12-105, and that such violation of law is a criminal offense.
Judicial Notice of Fact—Unauthorized Practice of Law
Defendant moves the Court for written Judicial Notice of Fact that Tom Hatcher, formerly employed as a deputy by “Blount County Government”, is currently employed as “Blount County Circuit Court Clerk”, is not a “licensed” lawyer, and that Mr. Hatcher may thus be “practicing law without a license”, a criminal offense under Tennessee Code.
Judicial Notice of Fact—Legislature Honors Hit-And-Run Killer
Defendant moves the Court for written Judicial Notice of Fact that the Tennessee legislature, with its passage of 1999 TN S.B. 923, did in fact name a public highway in Blount County, in honor of a previously convicted hit-and-run killer, named Senator Carl Koella, and that Koella pled guilty to “leaving the scene of a fatal accident” that resulted in the death of Terry Barnard in Blount County, and that Plaintiff’s outrageous signs rewarding this homicide are currently posted in Blount County.
SENATE BILL 923 By Clabough
April 7, 1999
AN ACT to designate a certain
segment of Interstate 140 as the “
BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to
the contrary, that segment of Interstate Highway 140 beginning at its
intersection with Interstate 40 in
SECTION 2. The Department of
Transportation is directed to erect suitable markers or to affix suitable signs
designating such segment of Interstate Highway 140 as the “
Fifth Affirmative Defense—Equal Protection
Equal Protection doctrine, under the
Judicial Notice of Fact—Criminal Informant
Defendant moves the Court for written Judicial Notice of Fact that complainant “’Josh’ Antras” did in fact criminally violate Tennessee Code on numerous occasions, as recorded by Plaintiff’s “FLASHBACK DVR In-Car Digital Video Recorder” system, and preserved on Certified copy of DVD-R, in possession of Plaintiff, located in Plaintiff’s business records.
Complainant Antras did in fact violate the following criminal offenses, by his own admission, in facts arising from same transaction as Plaintiff’s complaint, including speeding in excess of 30mph above posted speed limit, during the 15-second “high-speed chase”:
55-8-149. Requirements for stop signs - Vehicles and streetcars must stop at stop signs – Penalty
(c) Every driver of a vehicle and every operator of a streetcar approaching a stop sign shall stop before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection, or in the event there is no crosswalk, shall stop at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, then at the point nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver or operator has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering the intersection
(d) A violation of this section is a Class C misdemeanor
(a) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an emergency call, or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, or when responding to but not upon returning from a fire alarm, may exercise the privileges set forth in this section, but subject to the conditions herein stated.
(c) (1) The exemptions granted under subsection (b) to a driver of an authorized emergency vehicle shall only apply when such vehicle is making use of audible and visual signals.
(Class C misdemeanor)
(a) Any person who drives any vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property commits reckless driving.
(b) A violation of this section is a Class B misdemeanor.
The department of transportation is hereby authorized to determine those portions of any highway where overtaking and passing or driving to the left of the roadway would be especially hazardous and may by appropriate signs or markings on the roadway indicate the beginning and end of such zones. When such signs or markings are in place and clearly visible to an ordinarily observant person, every driver of a vehicle shall obey the directions thereof.
(1) "Drag racing" means:
(A) That use of any motor vehicle for the purpose of ascertaining the maximum speed obtainable by the vehicle;
(B) The use of any motor vehicle for the purpose of ascertaining the highest obtainable speed of the vehicle within a certain distance or within a certain time limit;
(C) The use of any one (1) or more motor vehicles for the purpose of comparing the relative speeds of such vehicle or vehicles, or for comparing the relative speeds of such vehicle or vehicles within a certain distance or within a certain time limit;
(D) The use of one (1) or more motor vehicles in an attempt to outgain, outdistance or to arrive at a given destination simultaneous with or prior to that of any other motor vehicle; or
(E) The use of any motor vehicle for the purpose of the accepting of, or the carrying out of any challenge, made orally, in writing, or otherwise, made or received with reference to the performance abilities of one (1) or more motor vehicles;
Drag racing is hereby declared to be a Class B misdemeanor, and any person or persons who operate a motor vehicle or motor vehicles upon the public highways of this state, or while on the premises of any shopping center, trailer park, any apartment house complex, or any other premises generally frequented by the public at large, or who is a participant therein, for the purpose of "drag racing" commits a Class B misdemeanor unless such premises are properly licensed for such purpose.
Sixth Affirmative Defense—Equal Protection—Abuse of Discretion
Constitutional Equal Protection doctrine, under the Tennessee Constitution and U.S. Constitution, provides that:
all persons in
(b) that all prosecutions for alleged violations of Tennessee Code Title 55 be dismissed, including Plaintiff’s complaint against Defendant, or;
(c) “’Josh’ Antras” be immediately arrested and prosecuted for the above named criminal offenses under Tennessee Code, as admitted by Plaintiff in its DVD-R video recording of complainant’s driving offenses.
“Selective enforcement” in this situation is abuse of discretion, for endangering public safety.
Seventh Affirmative Defense—Illegality
Plaintiff induced Defendant into an illegal “Driver License” contract, essentially a license to perpetrate illegal acts, since normal and safe driving behavior is in fact a near-continuous criminal violation of Tennessee Code Title 55.
1. A revocable permission to commit some act that would otherwise be unlawful.
–Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Edition
As a result, the contract that is the subject of Plaintiff's complaint is unenforceable because it is illegal, and therefore void.
Eighth Affirmative Defense—License
Plaintiff granted Defendant a “Tennessee Driver License” contract, essentially a license to perform the illegal act of “driving”, for which consideration was paid to Plaintiff by Defendant. Defendant was not in breach of payment for said license, which grants immunity from prosecution for the crime of “driving” of public highways.
2. The certification or document evidencing such permission.
–Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Edition
Ninth Affirmative Defense—Necessity or Justification
Defendant claims necessity or justification as defense to Plaintiff’s claim of alleged violation of terms of “Tennessee Driver License” contract.
Tenth Affirmative Defense—Impossibility of Performance—Entrapment
Defendant claims impossibility of performance as defense to Plaintiff’s claim of alleged violation of terms of “Tennessee Driver License” contract, since all normal and safe driving, with due regard for other travelers, is declared “illegal”.
Eleventh Affirmative Defense—Due Diligence
Defendant claims due diligence as defense to Plaintiff’s claim of alleged violation of terms of “Tennessee Driver License” contract.
Twelth Defense—Fraudulent Concealment—Denial of Due Process
Defendant claims fraudulent concealment as defense to Plaintiff’s claim of alleged violation of terms of “Tennessee Driver License” contract, in that Rules of Court are rendered “Top Secret” by a locked “public law library” in “Blount County Justice Center”, and by the fact that there are NO published “Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure in General Sessions Court”, nor “Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure in General Sessions Court”, nor “Sentencing Guidelines for Small Offenses on Appeal from General Sessions Court”, to give due process notice to defendants of Tennessee Rules of Court. Defendants are illegally denied subpoena power by Blount County Circuit Court Clerk, which is also a denial of due process.
Thirteenth Defense—Frivolous Claim
Plaintiff’s claim is frivolous, in that there is no allegation of Defendant’s negligence, no allegation of that Defendant negligently nor recklessly nor maliciously “crashed”, no allegation of existence of an injured “victim”, and no allegation of financial damages to a “victim”. Defendant did in fact drive safely and reasonably for the conditions, with due regard for all other travelers.
Fourteenth Defense—Plaintiff is a Danger to Public Safety
Plaintiff denies opportunity for advanced certification, licensing and training for safe operation of “high performance” vehicles, and/or safe operation at higher speeds, as routinely allowed by U.S. Government’s Federal Aviation Administration licensing program, to “private pilots” and “commercial pilots”. Plaintiff’s “Driver License” contract is void for failing to serve a legitimate purpose for improving “public safety”.
Plaintiff’s employees, i.e., “law enforcement officers”, fail to serve a valid purpose for public safety, in that they carry guns to kill “drivers” and travelers, and are not trained in medical “first aid”, nor do they carry “first responder equipment”, nor do they carry advanced lifesaving equipment, such as required for “rescue squads” and “ambulance” personnel, and “fire department” personnel.
Plaintiff’s employees, i.e., “law enforcement officers”, lack proper education and training in safe driving at high speeds, and do in fact cause crashes on a regular basis. Complainant Antras did in fact cross the double yellow line at more than double the posted speed limit, on a blind curve signposted as “DANGEROUS CURVE”, as admitted by Plaintiff on its recorded video from Complainant’s vehicle.
Plaintiff’s employees, i.e., “law enforcement officers”, in fact do kill over 300 Americans annually, mainly for alleged breach of civil “Driver License” contract.
Fifteenth Defense—Plaintiff’s License Contract
Plaintiff’s anti-American “Driver License” violates legislative intent of Declaration of Independence, U.S. Constitution and its Amendments in “Bill of Rights”.
Communist Manifesto, 6th Plank:
Government control of communications and transportation.
Defendant denies that Plaintiff has a valid cause of action.
Defendant denies that Defendant breached any contract.
Defendant denies that Defendant committed negligence.
Defendant denies that Defendant perpetrated any “crime” by allegedly failing to stop at a sign post.
Defendant denies responsibility to Plaintiff in this litigation for breach of contract by allegedly failing to stop at a sign post.
All allegations of the Complaint not admitted or denied above are hereby denied.
Motion for Trial by Magistrate in the
Defendant moves the Court for trial by magistrate in the Court of General Sessions, per Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure 5(b), and retaining right to trial by jury on appeal.
Defendant moves the Court for all testimony to be recorded and preserved by electronic means, per TCA 20-9-104, with access to Defendant for those recordings.
Defendant moves the Court for access to computer with DVD-R drive, to display Plaintiff’s in-car video evidence on the facts in this case.
John Davis Lee II, pro se
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
on this ____ day of _______________, ______.
John Davis Lee II, pro se